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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Res Judicata-Proof of Non-Dischargeability of Judg-
ment Under Section 17(a)
Plaintiff, holder of two Vermont judgments against defendant, duly
scheduled them against defendant in bankruptcy. Later, an effort to
have the judgments discharged in a state court was resisted by plain-
tiff on the grounds that they were for a "willful and malicious injury"
within section 17(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, and, therefore, excepted
from discharge.' The claim was based on the granting by the original
Vermont trial court of plaintiff's motion for a certificate that close jail
confinement was justified to enforce his judgments, a procedure author-
ized by Vermont statute only when the ".... cause of action arose from
the willful and malicious act or neglect of the defendant.12 Held:
the judgments were discharged. The meaning placed on the words
"willful and malicious" by the Vermont court was broader and more
inclusive than that ascribed to the same words in the Bankruptcy Act;
therefore, the finding of the Vermont court was not res judicata as to
the dischargeability of the judgment.3
It is generally held that a court may not go beyond the record of
the court in which a judgment was rendered to determine whether
the cause of action was one for a "willful and malicious injury;" 4 how-
ever, there is authority to the contrary. The reasoning advanced for
this rule has been that to look behind the record would amount to
collateral attack,5 in violation of the rule of res judicata. A few courts
have adopted a middle view, holding that where the record is am-
130 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1946). Section 17(a)
reads: ". . . a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts ... except such as ... (2) are'liabilities . .. for willful and
malicious injuries to the person or property of another. . .
- Vt. Rev. Stat. § 2246 (1947).
'Schenfeld v. Lawlor, 281 App. Div. 265, 119 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dep't 1953).
Consol. Plan of Connecticut v. Bonitatibus, 130 Conn. 199, 33 A.2d 140
(1943); Rice v. Guider, 275 Mich. 14, 265 N.W. 777 (1936); Ehnes v. Generazzo,
19 N.J. Misc. 393, 20 A.2d 513 (C.P. 1941). Cf. In re La Porte, 54 F. Supp. 911
(W.D.N.Y. 1943); In re Danahy, 45 F. Supp. 758 (W.D.N.Y. 1942). Also see
Peerson v. Mitchell, 205 Okla. 530, 239 P.2d 1028 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
866 (1951).
When accord and satisfaction has replaced the judgment for willful and
malicious injury, and an action is subsequently brought on this new agreement,
the question of whether the court will go beyond the record of the original
action is of prime importance. Treatment of this question, however, is beyond
the scope of this note.
See In re Stone, 278 Fed. 566, 567 (N.D.N.Y. 1922); Nichols v. Doak, 48
Wash. 457, 459, 93 Pac. 919, 920 (1919) ("The judgments had stood for years un-
attacked by appeal or otherwise. To have allowed the contradiction of the
terms of the judgments.., would have permitted in this action a trial of the
former actions upon their merits. Such would have amounted to a collateral
attack on the judgments."); Peerson v. Mitchell, 205 Okla. 530, 239 P.2d 1028
(1950).
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biguous,6 or fails completely to disclose the nature of the action,7
evidence aliunde may be introduced. The general refusal to go beyond
the record of the original action means that this record must necessarily
control the inspecting court's decision, and raises the problem of what
must be established in the record to show a judgment for "willful and
malicious injury."
"Willful and malicious injury" is defined by the universally ac-
cepted "Tinker rule" as ".. . willful disregard of what one knows to be
his duty, an act which is against good morals, and wrongful in and of
itself, and which necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally." 8
Success or failure of the judgment creditor depends upon the legis-
lative intent which the examining court feels is behind the "willful
and malicious" exception, and the accuracy with which this guides the
court in measuring each situation, as it appears from the record, against
the "Tinker rule."
The type of conduct which will except a judgment from discharge
varies widely with the type of offense in issue,9 and may vary greatly
from state to state when the same type of offense is being examined.
For example, in automobile accident cases, there may at one extreme
be a demand that "malice" be involved, 10 and at the other, an accept-
ance of conduct which is "reckless indifference."" This diversity of
holdings emphasises the difficulties faced by the judgment creditor
seeking to perfect a judgment which will bind an examining court to
hold his debt non-dischargeable. The instant case further illustrates
how difficult the problem my be in practice. Even where the judgment
describes the acts of the defendant as "willful and malicious," the
creditor may not have met the standard of the Bankruptcy Act.
Another recent case has held that inquiry should not be confined
to the record.12 This ruling would seem to serve the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act in ascertaining those persons who are "honest debtors"
I Peters v. United States, 177 Fed. 885 (7th Cir. 1910); Bannon v. Knauss, 57
Ohio App. 288, 13 N.E.2d 733 (1937).
" See Bannon v. Knauss, 57 Ohio App. 288, 13 N.E. 2d 733 (1937).
8 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
9 In "dog-bite" cases, the willfulness of the conduct may be implicit in the
cause of action. Jaco v. Baker, 174 Ore. 191, 148 P.2d 938 (1944). In conversion
cases, the willful and malicious nature of the conversion must be proven. In
re Nordlight, 3 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). In automobile accident cases, the
standard is varied. See cases cited infra notes 10 and 11. In assault cases,
willful and malicious conduct may be part of the very nature of the tort. Peters
v. United States, 177 Fed. 885 (7th Cir. 1910). Contra: In re De Lauro,- 1 F.
Supp. 678 (D. Conn. 1932).
10 In re Vena, 46 F.2d 81 (W.D. Wash. 1930). Contra: In re Greene, 87 F.2d
951 (7th Cir. 1937) (".. .willful and malicious as used in the Bankruptcy Act
... need not involve actual malice as we usually think of the term.").
In re Kubiniec, 2 F. Supp. 632 (W.D.N.Y. 1932).
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Golombosky, 133 Conn. 317, 50 A.2d
817 (1946).

